

No. Col. Frenge talk

Public does not give high rating

or high priority

to achieving Frenge

(win Moradali!)

But: Alt. Hyps: - Why think R is for Frenge

- We failed to make the Frenge an issue (major); - Why think (perceive?) Moradali was not for a Frenge?

(and note: "Incident II, Stealth, ALCMs, etc. M vs. NEU; Reduced mil. budget...")

- We failed to get a strong Frenge candidate ^{or VP}

(though almost all Dem candidates "supported")

- Why did not know about moratorium

(which M's people opposed

in platform committee).

- Also: the early support for Frenge was in absence of any negot; not clear to prefer Frenge to START, build-down, SALT-II-II, Zero-Option — or R's "Frenge after Reductions — on — basis — of Equality and Stability — and unity — Alliance — needs..." (achieved by build-up during negot, SDI...)

Public

- Support for risking nuclear war, threats (CPD)

- We (Frenge) haven't addressed:

- Why (w/ot ~~error~~ strategy, foreign policy) has the no President has sought a Frenge;

- Why the new types of weapons

- Why they are specially dangerous;

False assurance: — esp. in the light of US EU policy, which has frequently brought us closer to nuclear war than public imagines

"No nuclear war since 1945." (Public thinks: "We've never got close")

(No Euro war — thanks to Warsaw (2 nuclear of "near-collisions" and aircraft Port and SU arms, " " "near-accidents/multi-doms" " " false alarm of warning system (see LOR) too!)

To Freya:

- What would you do [to lower l.t. + s.+ risk
of nuclear war, reverse arms race]
if you were convinced that a ^{comprehensive} bilateral freeze
was unattainable

(c) for next 4 years ?

- If you say (full) F as
"merely a tactic" — what's
the next tactic?

(6) independent?

- Have address, change; public microreproductions on

('Work Series' —
has this right)
is written on
Paper, 4 Dec 89
Have come ?!

- EU policy (Ecu, outside Ecu)
+ history of threats, prospects.

+ history of threats, perhaps.

- R intentions, prospects?

- SU desire to make and keep agreement?

- level between threats, preparation/plans, and "objective risk"

- Comparison over "determining," "stabilizing," 2) And now?

- How address, change, public: "evening" (no. interests)

- willing to (even) risk (of) nuclear war?

" " throat under FU

- obliges to hand up weapons to individuals

("to make US (interests) secure : not }

using weapons but by building and having them?

Hypo: (you (public)) underestimate risks and linkages of need to threats and props (+ interaction with SO); underest "seriousness" of "bluffs" for at least some President + officials; mis-read pub. ans; and Education: Cath, oth Churches (fewer?!); ^{region} attractive tactics.

SANE, Common Cause, UCAM

CDI, IPS

and/or: public didn't believe that
(not far) Mondale would lead to lower
risks of war and/or end of arms race!

"Lessons" of OP + Election

0. Either public doesn't have sense of high priority + urgency

1. Pivotal role of beliefs about SU (+US)

2. " " " ^{public's position} attitudes about confidence,

Public "approval demonstration of strength"

legitimacy/morality (lets on
aboutness)

Power, weapons, budget, RDP, deployments, bloodshed, and risks

of threats (vs. "use")

3. R ability to adapt, shift his rationale to

in acceptance of progress;

offer "more belief" to avoid war,

and achieve agreement!

(see

4. Public attitudes may be more "consistent", less
volatile, and more supportive of R progress and
policies (as to as presented & since 1984) than
DP wishes.

(See also Central America!)

5. Public belief that arms race can be lost

and build-up the " (24) best alternative to a Freeze."

(Mondale)

→ 6. Public does not agree with President Carter:

— "One cannot ^{or risk} threaten what one must not do."

vs. "abolition"

(and "perpetual system")

(read, "human nature" (false))

or war/state system.

(true - vs. Schell)

— Verification doesn't matter: risk of possession is
greater

— SU could not take advantage; or, risk is more
acceptable than risk of war

— Risk + weapons can be abolished.

[What of: do in pursuit of
commitment to peace,
to deter/retaliate to "evil out"?

2. — Frege focussed on R's 1980-83 peculiar beliefs
(strong form of (41)) : Power can & must be used; no war can be
^{initiated, won, survived.}
But R's program do not depend on these; he was
able to switch his rationale to that of Carter,
Ford, Nixon.... ("keep up"; bargaining chips;
negot.... ;

Estab agrees that we do have a war;
in fact, more than one;
in fact, all that R sees (e.g. in crises — in eyes of others
at least)

|| [JFK, LBJ "used" war ^{thought} at least to influence his
bargains with USSR/Congress, improve/strengthen his
image...] [Chose not to challenge beliefs in usability
of Tanks — a forego then...]

Only goal is win; how much risk to take; how to
do it [Haig goal with Weinberger; Sagan with
Weinberger.... etc.]

if both sides

Public and experts differ on likelihood of war
(at least, in next 10 years) and consequences of
war; and public & R, on ability to win a war.

But — a determination not to lose a war and win ^{attaches} (give CW)
interlocks with SU determination " " " " — to
same effect as if both wanted to win: if (one) side
blocks a bilateral freeze.

Public stands in same relation to R's aim of superiority
as does SU-G.

! Check Caravansary/Palmyra, for notepad

8. R's "bluff/struggle" strategy looks esp. acceptable — or preferable — to public in light of the (renewed — partly of Carter! and former aides of N, Ford) CW attitudes: SC & Hitter. (though they don't accept the fully; or agree with Paul; Hence pressure on R to negot (though not to agree!)

9. Both ^{R+M} shifted do part of campaign, compared to 1976, (1980). But R shifted toward DP findings; M seemed to cater only to the "tough" or confused: ignoring the consensus, to which his programs were closer than Reagan's!

10. Voters for "peace and prosperity": avoiding war, sure war, successful negot, reductions...

[Freeze never explained why "Freeze" was more relevant a goal than "reductions." Analyze. Our target was (1981-82) "unlimited increases without any reductions, or even any negot!" — and rhetoric of "win, superiority, like nuclear goals that engaged against high costs + cos. of VN: N reduced both.

Freeze did not adjust its strategy to the new rhetoric and insurance of INF, START (KAL) — or election-year rhetoric. (Nor did Mondale).

30-31 11. Half disagree with R (CW) policies of threat + risk; but public is split on them, and confused, uncertain.

12. Ignorance of (real, historically dangerous) FCU policy.

13. Ignorance of actual verif. cap (secret!)

"Need for on-site inspection"; SC can fool us... "Absolute" (Mondale-type, 2d debate) verif. ^{for everything related} is a trap for Freeze! likewise, idea of "balance, parity" ^{trap} (for SC, too)

Public does not believe — and it's not true (tho' it's right) —
that:

1. Threat powers can't afford to 'bluff'.

("to be caught bluffing".)

2. It is immoral to threaten

or risk doing, or "proceed" —

what it is immoral to do.

3. Risks — or moral dilemmas, "immoral" choices —
can be eliminated, wholly avoided.

Even risks or choices of vastly immoral or
dangerous actions (nuclear attack).

[Hence, fact of risk does not disqualify a "option".]

4. It is immoral to threaten/risk a Greater Evil
to prevent (reduce risk of) a Lesser Evil.

[Though this would be a good rule. (?)

This does not mean that public is aware of actual
risks; or of alternatives; or of linkage of threats —
preps (credibility-enhancing actions, messages) — opponents'
fears, beliefs & actions — own institutions, fears — risk.

Not that public's "VN-M utilities" accord
with elites (w/ot "US vital interests").

Not that public understands elites (USG's) sum of
alternatives, aims, interests, tactical objectives...

or would understand these.

14. Idea of "balance, parity" (for SC, as well as US)
really derives from "multiple missions"

(which SC has: D-L; "big superpower, equal to US;
esp: intervention in TW, East Eur; domestic prestige/status quo

Strat Paper: "People in uncredentialed circles are aware of the danger posed by the nuclear arms race."

Necessary but not suff.

[NO: They are aware of the dangers of nuclear war!]

a trap for public

(... and of a refusal to negotiate (1981-82)) [1980-82: ~~The F~~ The F was a focus for those who were ~~frustrated~~ shocked by R, et al's commitments, AND BY AN ABSENCE OF NEGOTS. *

But many/most accept R's program which uses the arms race as an instrument of policy, precisely to avoid nuclear war [even given war/interruption] and to avoid war (arising out of "challenge to US interests." Esp. since R has added arms negots to his program. (The fact that he had not produced an agreement - or a Freeze - did not lose him votes).

Error

2. Did the F (not) really define itself as an alternative to - and even rejection of - the "weapon-
- weapon approach -

Public wants to know more than "first" step, anyway.

- instead of "in addition to"
Emphasis on F as "first step" implied ... rejection of MX, etc. were not meaningful "first steps" - a rejection of effort on these.

Error

(Actually, our high point was the Dec '82 vote against MX (in Denser Post) - our decline started with putting our efforts on Cong Res instead of MX in spring (when I came in) as in VN.
(We defined no necessaries short of full Freeze

* We did not criticize SALT-II or START-type agreements: esp. show urgency and high priority of a different approach.

3. We did not track that all the new weapons coming are dangerous, precisely because of the strength the Deadly Connection [~~is~~ not just "FU, FS; MX/D-5 as weapons of interruption, "union-busting"]]; that is why the need for a F is so urgent.

(Also: Building the MX, testing it, producing it,
deploying it — esp. in fixed silos — and all
uses of our weapons, and of the MX, as
instruments of intervention:

uses most people approve.

9 Dec 84

Good News:

Chris Paner

1. SDI Testing is not till 1989
2. O-S deployment is not till 1989; Testing (1987)
3. There is a very good chance to stop MX at 24 minutes the Moratorium
4. There is a good chance to extend ASAT test moratorium.
5. (Randy Forsberg): There is a "30%" chance of a moratorium on testing warheads.
6. We have forced Reagan into negotiating with Soviets, and perhaps even to want a cosmetic agreement.
7. ~~US~~ ^{USSR} Soviets want to extend Strategic Arms Agreement on observance of SALT-II — which R may do!

8. Agents (must mean to penetrate us) may well keep the SO from breaking through the SALT accord (which would take the lid off MX).

— and keep them from taking irreversible steps to escalate our race, while we and Congress keep R from doing so!

[One black spot: SCCMs: CP "can't explain" why Congress can't take SCCM ban seriously.]

9. The attendance at the Fringe Conf — >700 (100 times any largest ever! 80% for first time! great energy...

We can put pressure on Congress, just as we did ~~offer~~ cut R's cost-accounts, gained in Senate. We shall expect as a movement, and are growing, despite election!

^{From}
- We can carry out "big" program: (MX, ASAT, +) pressure for

Congress/Pres:
Stop Race: B. for
at this time
Oppose SDI
because it
assumes continued,
very dangerous
race

Test ban in spring;
Q 6 CD at NTS
Test-ban (and pressure relating to NPT) in fall...
Moratorium Day in fall!

[Get one Expe Com in spring]
[Relate to RF's "IDDS"]

- MBG - But Billy Graham and Pope, etc. to call for
test moratorium

Pressure for this at Bangkok-Shanghai meeting!
(Vigil - pickets!)

[TR tells the to Taiwan
in Vienna meeting (with James
Jackson) in Jan 1985]

(GROMYKO SHOULD OFFER!)

START MORATORIUM!

recursion!
(over
Kevin Phillips)

- 1986: make new Dem
"over" Demos!

EVEN, ON MISSILE TESTS, INC. SLBM!

[STOP D-5 - ON BOTH SIDES!

THUS - WITH LIMIT ON MX -

AVERT US FS CAP (AND

THUS SU LOW!) THROUGH 1989,

THEN BEYOND, BY FREEZE!

+1988

1988: A candidate, and winner, truly devoted to "stop
and reverse" the arms race" (STAR) or (STARTAR)
(change international policy and relations with TW and SU)

[Our "problem" with SU: its
support for bilateral trade relations (Krus),
and for "economic nationalist" regimes
and movements in the TW, resisting
our control!]

1989: Foreign and NFU!

[Vo. Raulo Fushy, evening of 8 Dec: "We want stop ^{sub?} any weapons: MX, SLCTs, ASAT, D-5...
kill or contain expectations! "Congress must stop this, and SDI test, SLCTs, PZ, MX will
provide SU build-up"

ipm: 29 Nov 84

29 Nov 84

Public belief that arms race can be lost
(though not won) — and that US not not fall
behind

corresponds to SU attitude!

and is, *as Bonet says, "as destruction of
(US/SU) security" as the Reagan attitude that
superiority can and must be won.

~~Reagan~~ (2) +

R — "SU acts
on the defense
budget
needs"

Baron Sherman: It puts the US public in
the same relation to Reagan's policies as
is the SU:

"Set as if an unlimited arms race
were second-best to a limited Freeze,"

If a Freeze is unattainable (because
R won't propose it)
then "match the opponent"

(US public believes US is "responding" to SU
initiations; SU now likewise, with more validity
(except for SS-20./PII).

Either convince public that US is initiating
moves; or that US should not "respond."

But now, neither US public nor SU Gov is
willing to take "unilateral initiation"

(unconditional)
("national")
self-determined

DY:

[but: 61% support
6-month moratorium!]

Kandauer: Polls show war/peace/nuclear
issue was 2d to economy — but a
very distant 2d

(so of hyp. that we failed to make
it a high priority was right and wrong;
it was not "5th or 6th" — but was "low."

— UCB census was 80-90% for Mondale!
all UC censuses were, except Irvine!

"To be against nuclear war is not necessarily
to be against any war (i.e. absence of a
Freye)

— That R's public position?

("We can never be won
and must never be fought")

R doesn't want ~~more~~ war — isn't proposing it...
he wants "to reduce the risk of any war — by reducing risk
"If Freye can't be verified" of "war."
(or — if R thinks it can't...)

(Even so — if SU stopped

(i.e. SU said it stopped,
and R couldn't prove otherwise...)

[Public doesn't see coming generation of US
weapons as penetrating, ^{additionally} newly dangerous;
nor "as ^{big} dangerous to us" as rather what SU
does" —

to a degree that antagonizes

- 1) intimidating effort on SU
- 2) "need" to "keep up" with SU

} for Type II
effects

Hyp: Challenge public's underlying perception of threats,
highlighted risks, intimidation — giving actual
coupling of these to actual increases in risk.

Thus, public attitudes are more consistent
(less easily shifted?)

and more supportive of Reagan policies
(guaranteeing abandon of Frege, or sum of negot on
Frege)

than Dan York, infers.

As long as he can rationalize not discussing
a Frege ...

or merely, prove ~~to~~ adequate on this, and
get away with it (in part, because this is
not highest public concern ...)

- then the concept his build-up - not
to gain superiority, but to "keep up."

(SU helps R by refusing to halt, "unilaterally.")

(DV: SU "peace offensive" in late '50's was
also political, not addressed to real risk of
war but to opposing US econ/pol hegemony in
Europe).

(at "Beyond CW" Conf. (Klein-Epstein
30 Nov 84

DE:

Reagan's policy does not depend on Reagan's
beliefs or claims. ~~even~~

The Frege, in effect, focused on refuting R's
peculiar beliefs — ("we war can be limited, war, survival; ^{survival} is attainable.")
and we succeeded! (DY's results)

But the main outline + program of R's policies
(except his early refusal to negotiate! and "B-1 + Stealth")
were McN / N / Ford / Carter programs and policies.

(— or, ^{survival}: McN, Carter)
(each of these may have privately hoped to
move on to more substantive limits, ~~ask~~ as in Frege:
but this program was the same, and they justified them
by arguments other than Reagan's (CDD) private views.

Mondale offered same programs (— ^{and B-1} MX, ^{supposedly});
and ~~that~~ public could believe (as it wanted to)
that R was more likely to get good results in negot.,
given his "reluctance".

We did not refute the claim that the Reagan program
— along with, + reinforced by, his claimed "beliefs" and
(blatantly, reckless, anti-limit) negot., but also along with
his willingness to compromise and back down when risks and costs
actually rise — was more likely to lead to reducing risks
of nuclear war, compared to, say, ^{peace} Jackson's (Thayer) program,
(his abuse of ^{bilateral} Frege) and — or to Mondale's administration
of the same program, or of negot.

Public did not vote for nuclear war, or for increased
risk of nuclear war; R was not selling them.
(Public believes that risk of nuclear war can never be eliminated. Correct.)

? Martin Skerwine
MS/DE:

Why did SU "give us trouble": Africa during
detente, discredit HAK and detente?

MS: Mistake on large point.

Cf. ^{relative} ability of UK to influence US opinion before
WWI, vs. German diplomacy.
(or WWII)

SU = Russia. If you'd, say, Dalrymple, as useful
instruct, guide, but to be taken with caution - "He's lived
in US too long."

Would he, or not, "sell out" TW for removals from US?

MS: CW is built into our society;

- teaching institutions, with positions & influence to protect.
- flows of resources: MIC: regions (California, Conn,
...)

DE: If public could learn from Feltz/Schell about
"badness" of nuclear war and impossibility of
winning the arms race - was this because he had
not been actively indoctrinated on the other side - and all
the facts are on one side ("scientists" & facts; the record...)?

But Reagan was able to draw support for his
taking on a combination of anti-Soviet, CW attitudes
(on which he have been and are being indoctrinated; and
he cannot be "refuted" by "science" or the historical record.)
folk-wisdom (imperial, family...), and assertions as to how
"best" to reduce risk of nuclear war (and reduce other
objections: "avoid war", "reduce corruption", "Con expansion",
etc.) (get access to resources...)

and reality
MIC, universities
(jobs)...
- MNCs...

"Beyond CW"

29 NOV 84

Barnet: "Pleasant mount has won many battles, but seems to have lost the war. At least, the war is not going well."

DP poll - our arguments [as far as "we" make
in great opposition to R arguments: then - limited!]
have been accepted.

"If you believe X, Y, Z, ... you can't accept the
policy of a dynamic and race."

[NO! That's DP's inference.

But R's and policy can be and is
(tacitly, covertly) derived from other arguments, premises,
that are consistent with the whole set of public
opinions (which DP sees as "unconsistently.")

M. L. Levin: It's illegal, even in US, to shout "Fire" in a crowded theater.

Is it acceptable speech to threaten
TN Holocaust? (Not domestically).

Dahl says
No.

MS "Public doesn't recognize that Stable Deterrence is not
certain to work; and that 99.9% reliability is not enough."

ANW School. TYPE I
[NO. Public believes "deterrence" in some form will always
be necessary [certainly, as long as wars persist; and
probably, states]. including civil wars

Frage did
that, for Frage: "abolition of nukes" would do that (or is possible). So issue
but lacked
(convincing)
program before
a Frage. reducing risk. Show convincing - in face of CW beliefs - that another
path is less risky.
TO PEOPLE WHO NOW HOLD CW BELIEFS...

Education:

9 Dec 84

We can target public:

the dangers of nuclear war
and the unnecessary costs of the (mutual) arms race

We have yet to touch:

- a) - the dangers of the nuclear arms race,
- b) - the urgency of stopping the coming generation of weapons
pref. bilaterally,
but multilaterally, nationally, unconditionally
- c) - the reasons for the urgency: the fact that there
new weapons

1) strengthen the deadly connection

(as if we intended to do)

OR (if do not sound "threats" to do this!)

2) make arms race - and its ^{high} risks -
irreversible. (e.g. SCCM)

3) press both sides toward COW, disarmament
(esp. when we get FS cap.)

4) Stimulate proliferation.

(a) The means aside from full Freeze that
can stop these weapons. The risks of particular weapons
(FS, verification). "An arms race (MX, etc.) not avoid - but to Freeze!"

(c) The means that now exist for verification.

Deadly Connection

(f) The EU policy; past EU threats.

(g) The dangers of "keeping arms ~~safe~~ (contingency)
insurance, insurance about US EU, ~~all~~ else, FS

(b) The dangers ^{+ costs} of US intervention, war ⁽²⁾ and war
(b) arms race

(i) Alternatives to US intervention policy (w/o + TW)
and CW (w/o + SC, arms race, intervention)
and "independent role" (w/o + Eur + TW: flow of resources).

Can many Freeze supporters believe R endorsed Freeze.

Summary: Many people feel SC has rejected Freeze; why? "If walked out of the Freeze (START!) negot."

(If don't know the difference!

How much do they care?

Do they prefer START?

(Why not!)

} yeah, yeah

(i.e. We won for traditional arms control, at its worst! We had a proposal — better than START-II — (or NEU, ... or bilateral disarm, or anti-PH, or anti-MX) — at a time when R had nothing!)

(Big shock of Sept-Oct — realizing that half (?) of "supporters" (= polls) would vote for R; half of R voters were of "supporters"!

[We don't need more "supporters" (on this measure of "poll support":

"in polls, but not at the polls":)

like Congressional "supporters" who also support MX!

[We made MX vulnerable; but we didn't feel or recognize Dec 82 vote as our victory (either due to us, or as what we wanted, needed); nor take steps to consolidate it. ~~At the~~

[Could it be — as one Wise ex-Aspin aide said — that Aspin had committed himself to his MX-Midnight "flexibility" "compromise before Dec, when MX looked unbeatable? Or did he just see an opportunity to "show clout" (get MIC PAC support — for Senate?) ^{based on} "showing" ^{the} "unbeatable" of MX?

848-4107
Mark Mirade
KPFA

Samuel Morrison
Naval Intelligence

Would like to
get Dan's opinion
Court ruled that
the case could
proceed under the
Espionage law
Start tonight, if possible
A few minutes.